Buffalo Law Review
Volume 9

Number 1

Article 63

10-1-1959

Criminal Law—Immunity of Prospective Defendant from Grand
Jury Indictment
Buffalo Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview

Recommended Citation
Buffalo Law Review, Criminal Law—Immunity of Prospective Defendant from Grand Jury Indictment, 9
Buff. L. Rev. 120 (1959).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol9/iss1/63

This The Court of Appeals Term is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
trial, the trial judge should have granted defendant's motion and dismissed the
indictment.
When the Court in the case at bar proclaimed that it based its order of
dismissal on People v. Prosser,53 it was, in effect, granting the motion as a
matter of law and not as an exercise of discretion. The Court of Appeals felt
that since the difference in the time element between the case at bar and the
4
Prosser case was so great, the former did not fit within the rule of Prosser.5
Rather, this was a situation in which the judge was to exercise his power as a
matter of discretion and not of law. Therefore, the decision of the lower
court and the Appellate Division was erroneous.
It is true that the Court appears, in form at least, to be making a highly
technical distinction. It can be said, as the dissent felt, that any order granted
under Section 668 is an exercise of discretion, because of the very nature of
the statute. As a result, the granting of the motion, regardless of the basis
for the grant, is an exercise of discretion and should be considered as such.
In substance the opinion of the Court results in the same conclusion as
reached by Judge Desmond in his dissent. It is now settled by this decision
that Section 668 is purely discretionary. The effect of Prosser is limited to
drawing a line which if reached, represents an abuse of discretion.55
IMmUNITY OF PROSPECTIVE DEFENDANT FROM GRAND JURY INDICTMENT

In People v. Steuding5" the People appealed to the Court of Appeals
from an order of the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, dismissing the indictment of respondent by the Extraordinary Grand Jury investigating official
corruption in Ulster County. Respondent, a public official appearing pursuant
to a subpoena, was initially sworn and apprised of the fact that the Grand
Jury was not conferring any immunity upon him.57 He was also advised that
his testimony might be used against him and that he had the right to refuse to
answer any question that would tend to incriminate him.r" After being sworn
respondent executed a written waiver of any immunity or privilege concerning
questions asked relating to his official conduct, but refused to sign a general
waiver of immunity. The Grand Jury, ordered to disregard the testimony then
given by respondent, indicted him for conspiracy to bribe public officers and
of committing bribery.
The Court held that no statute conferring immunity could supersede the
constitutional right of a defendant or prospective defendant not to bear witness
against himself. His privilege was violated when he was called and examined
53. Ibid.
54. Supra note 52.

55. Supra note 52.
56. 6 N.Y.2d 214, 189 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1959).
57. N.Y. PEN. LAW § 2447 purports to confer immunity upon a person only after
he invokes his privilege against self-incrimination, and is then directed to answer the
questions asked. Section 2447 was enacted to replace § 2443, which provided complete
immunity at the outset of any proceeding.
58. N.Y. CoxsT., Art. I § 6; U.S. CoNsT., amend. V.
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before a grand jury, even though he did not claim the privilege. Section 2447
of the New York Penal Law is constitutional insofar as it applies to "witnesses," but it cannot be applied to a defendant insofar as it provides that he
must assert his privilege at the outset of the proceedings. The protection from
indictment and from use of any incriminating testimony elicited results automatically from a violation of the constitutional privilege.
The dissent found Section 2447 to be a mere procedural change in that
the witness must now assert the privilege before the immunity is granted. The
Section was not offensive if it did not impair any of the constitutional rights
of a witness or prospective defendant. Here the immunity is as broad as the
privilege, since no testimony given under the immunity may in any way be
used against the witness.59 When a witness or prospective defendant is subpoenaed before a Grand Jury, is apprised of his rights, and voluntarily testifies,
he is deemed to have waived his privilege. 60
In order to properly analyze Section 2447, it is essential to distinguish the
rights of an accused from those of an ordinary witness. The privilege of any
witness to refrain from giving incriminating answers must not be confused with
the right of an accused not to take the stand in a criminal prosecution against
him. Both come within the protection of the privilege. 61 The latter applies to
the defendant in every criminal case and he may not be called as a witness or
be interrogated by government counsel unless he voluntarily takes the stand
in his own behalf, thereby waiving the privilege.0 2 A defendant before a Grand
Jury under compulsion of a subpoena has been held to be immune from indictment.13 The calling of the accused as a witness virtually compels him to be a
witness against himself.64 However, in respect to persons not actually defendants it must appear at the time of the inquest that the person is a prospective defendant or he may be placed upon the stand as an ordinary witness.0 5
Therefore, Section 2447 is not a mere procedural change if applied to a defendant or prospective defendant since it requires him to take the stand in
contravention of his Constitutional right. The statute speaks in terms of a
"person" who is already in the position of giving testimony upon the witness
stand. It does not, by implication or otherwise, purport to affect any rights
of any person before the issuance of the subpoena. Upon the serving of the
subpoena the immunity formerly provided by Section 2443 is removed, and
procedurally postponed until the person thus subpoenaed claims his privilege
59. The dissent points out that 18 U.S.C. § 3486, substantially the same as § 2447,
was held to be constitutional in Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
60. People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901); Teachout v. People, 41
N.Y. 7 (1869).
61. United States v. Housing Foundation of America, Inc., 176 F.2d 665 (3d Cir.
1949).
62. United States v. Nesmith, 121 F. Supp. 758 (D.C. 1954); Finnegan v. United
States, 204 F.2d 105 (8th Cir. 1953), cert. denied 346 U.S. 821.
63. United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943).
64. People v. Molineux, supra note 60.
65. People v. Molineux, supra note 60.
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and is directed to answer. Therefore, since a defendant or prospective defendant cannot constitutionally be subpoenaed, the statute does not appear
to apply to such person, for his privilege attaches prior to the issuance of the
subpoena.
REQUIREMENTS FOR A PERJURY CONVICTION

The defendant in People v. Carman6" gave false answers under oath concerning her communist affiliation before the Commissioner of Investigation for
the City of New York. The investigation was made pursuant to the obligation
placed on the City by the New York Security Risk Law to investigate subversives working in security positions in the Department of Welfare. 7 The
defendant's subsequent conviction of second degree perjury was affirmed by
68
both the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals.
Defendant argued that the information did not satisfy Section 291 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 9 in that it did not set forth the subject matter of
the investigation in question. ° Because it was defective in this matter she
claimed that she did not have adequate notice to enable her to prepare a
defense of lack of jurisdiction. The Court held that Section 291 was satisfied
by the information stating that the "perjury was committed in a hearing and
Inquiry being conducted under the New York State Security Risk Law by the
City Department of investigation at its office by its authorized Examining
Inspector, etc."171 Defendant relied on People v. Gillette,72 in which case it
was held that the subject matter must be set forth so that the defendant may
adequately prepare a defense to show that the false testimony was not materially related to the subject under investigation. The Court rejected her
argument because at the time of the Gillette73 case there existed only one
degree of perjury and materiality was a necessary element. At the time the
present defendant perjured herself there were two degrees of perjury and she
was charged only with second degree, which crime did not require that the
false testimony relate materially to the subject of the investigation.74
Defendant's second contention, that the State did not prove the Commission's jurisdiction, was also decided against her. The crux of this contention
was that the prosecution must prove that her testimony was relevant and necessary to an investigation which was within the purview of the Commission to
66.

6 N.Y.2d 241, 189 N.Y.S.2d 188 (1959).

67. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 1101 et seq.
68. 7 A.D.2d 633, 180 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1st Dep't 1958).
69. N.Y. CoDE CIUM. PROC. § 291. "In an indictment for perjury or subornation of
perjury, it is sufficient to set forth the substance of the controversy or matter in respect
to which the crime was committed. ..."
70. The investigation might have been conducted under §§ 1104, 1105, 1106, 1108
of the New York Security Risk Law.
71. People v. Carman, supra note 66 at 191, 241.
72.

126 A.D. 665, 111 N.Y. Supp. 133 (1st Dep't 1908).

73.
74.

Ibid.
People v. Samuel, 259 A.D. 167, 18 N.Y.S.2d 532 (2d Dep't 1940), reversed on

other grounds, 284 N.Y. 410, 31 N.E.2d 752 (1940).
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